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Land Use Law Update: The 2015 Mid-Year Roundup
By Sarah J. Adams-Schoen
This update summarizes New York cases related
to land use and zoning that
were decided in the first half
of 2015.1 The courts (and
the litigants) sure have been
busy.

Accessory Structures
In Sacher v. Village of
Old Brookville,2 the Second
Department upheld the
zoning board of appeals
(ZBA) denial of variances for an accessory structure.
Following the denial by the ZBA of the Village of
Old Brookville of an application for setback and area
variances for a second-story addition to an accessory
building, and an affirmance by the trial court, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that
the finding of the zoning board that the detriment to
the community outweighed the benefit of granting the
requested variances had a rational basis in the record
and was not arbitrary and capricious.
The court reiterated that the statutory test requires
a ZBA, in determining whether to grant an area variance, to engage in a balancing test, weighing the benefit
to the applicant against the detriment to the health,
safety, and welfare of the neighborhood or community
if the variance is granted. In balancing the interests, the
ZBA must consider
1) whether an undesirable change will
be produced in the character of the
neighborhood or a detriment to nearby
properties will be created by the granting of the area variance; (2) whether
the benefit sought by the applicant can
be achieved by some method, feasible
for the applicant to pursue, other
than an area variance; (3) whether the
requested area variance is substantial;
(4) whether the proposed variance will
have an adverse effect or impact on
the physical or environmental conditions in the neighborhood or district;
and (5) whether the alleged difficulty
was self-created, which consideration
shall be relevant to the decision of the
board of appeals, but shall not necessarily preclude the granting of the area
variance.3
Further, the ZBA may consider personal observations of members of the ZBA and the ZBA is “entitled

to consider the effect its decision would have as a
precedent.”4

Conditional Uses
In Robert E. Havell Revocable Trust v. Zoning
Board of Appeals of Village of Monroe,5 the Second
Department reversed the lower court, and affirmed the
ZBA, holding that the ZBA’s determination that the
applicant’s use of the property for tire sales and related
services was a conditional use, rather than a use permitted as right, was not illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or
an abuse of discretion.
The court ruled that the Supreme Court erred when
it disregarded the full administrative record submitted
by the ZBA on the ground that it was uncertified and
granted the petition. The court explained that “[s]ince
there was no allegation or indication that a substantial
right of the petitioner was prejudiced by the lack of a
certification, the Supreme Court should have disregarded the defect, and decided the matter on the merits.”6
The court went on to address the merits, concluding that the ZBA’s determination was consistent with
the applicable zoning code notwithstanding an ambiguity in the code. The code specifically listed “repair
service, including automotive” as uses permitted as of
right and “tire sales and service” as conditional uses.
The code provided, however, that “in the event of
conflict in the terminology of any section or part thereof
of this chapter, the more restrictive provisions shall control.”7 Thus, the court confirmed the ZBA’s determination that the proposed use of the properties for tire sales
was a conditional use.

Nonconforming Use
In TAC Peek Equities, Ltd. v. Town of Putnam Zoning Board of Appeals,8 the Second Department ruled
that a property did not lose its nonconforming-use status due to inactivity. The petitioners had appealed the
denial of a permit to operate an automotive repair shop
on their property. The court began by explaining that
the trial court had erred in transferring the proceeding
to the appellate court pursuant to CPLR § 7804(g), because the determination to be reviewed was not made
after a trial-type hearing at which evidence was taken
and was therefore not subject to substantial evidence
review. The court went on to consider the merits, however, for the sake of judicial economy.
The court then ruled that the ZBA determination
that the petitioner’s property had lost its nonconforming-use status as an automotive repair shop did not
have a rational basis. The relevant zoning code provides
that a nonconforming-use status is lost when such non-
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conforming use “is inactive or ceases…for a continuous period of more than two years.”9 The court found
that contrary to the ZBA’s contention, the minimal
extent of the nonconforming use in this case did not
constitute either inactivity or cessation for the requisite
time period, because there had been some automotive
repair activity during that time. The court granted the
petition as against the ZBA without costs, annulled
the ZBA determination, and remitted the matter to the
building inspector to issue the requested permit.

Open Meetings
In Ballard v. New York Safety Track, LLC,10 the
Third Department affirmed the Supreme Court ruling
that the Town committed violations of the Open Meetings Law when the Planning Board went into executive
session on several occasions leading up to the execution of the 2013 agreement discussed above. The court
explained that
“While a governing body may enter
into an executive session, it may do so
only for certain purposes, including,
as is relevant here, the consideration
of an appointment or to engage in private discussions relating to proposed
or pending litigation. However, the
body must “identify the subject matter
to be discussed…with some degree of
particularity.”11
The court rejected the Town’s claim that any
discussion of the 2013 agreement was protected by
the attorney-client privilege, because, the court noted,
“the Planning Board’s inclusion of additional persons
into the session necessarily eliminated any reasonable
expectation of confidentiality, effectively waiving any
privilege attendant to such conversations.”12
The court also found that the Town’s insistence
that it was not obliged to make the proposed 2013
agreement available to petitioners before it was put to
a vote “denied petitioners ‘any meaningful participation’ in the process leading to the final adoption of the
controversial 2013 agreement, in clear contravention of
Public Officers Law § 103(e).”13 Additionally, the court
found that the Town Clerk’s failure to make the minutes from a March 2013 Planning Board meeting available within “two weeks from the date” of the meeting
was a violation of Public Officers Law § 106(3). On
these bases, the court affirmed the Supreme Court’s
award of counsel fees and costs to the petitioners.14

Rebuilding and Equal Protection
In Witt v. Village of Mamaroneck,15 the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim arising
out of rebuilding efforts following Hurricane Irene.
Plaintiff homeowners brought an action against the
28

Village of Mamaroneck and Building Inspector Robert
Melillo pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The action arose
from the legal requirements defendants imposed on the
plaintiffs in connection with their efforts to repair their
home in the aftermath of Hurricane Irene. The plaintiffs
maintained that similarly situated homeowners were
not subjected to the same treatment, which therefore
constituted a violation of their equal protection and
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The plaintiffs also alleged a Monell claim
against the Village. The court dismissed these claims
and gave the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint.
The Amended Complaint raised equal protection,
substantive due process, and procedural due process
claims, along with a Monell claim against the Village as
well as various claims for relief under state law.
The court granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss. First, as for the equal protection and selective
enforcement claims, the court found that the plaintiffs
failed to allege differential treatment from similarly
situated individuals. Second, as for the due process
claims, the court found that even if the plaintiffs had
carried their burden of establishing the deprivation of
a cognizable property interest, it was “doubtful” that
the defendants’ acts were arbitrary, conscience-shocking, or oppressive in the constitutional sense, and not
merely incorrect or ill-advised. Finally, the court found
that, because a Monell claim cannot be made absent an
underlying constitutional violation, the plaintiffs Monell
claim against the Village must also fail because a § 1983
claim can only be brought against a municipality if the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional was the
result of an official policy or custom, which was not the
case here.

RLUIPA
On March 27, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York ruled in Bernstein v.
Wesley Hills16 that four villages’ litigation of a town’s
SEQRA review was not actionable under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
granting summary judgment in favor of all defendants
in the consolidated action. The plaintiffs in this case (religious corporations and individuals affiliated with the
Chofetz Chaim sect of Orthodox Judaism) alleged that
the four villages within the Town of Ramapo discriminated against them by attempting to stop development
of a proposed religious educational center and multifamily housing development and by colluding to bring
a separate 2004 action (the “Chestnut Ridge Action”).
The Villages prevailed on their SEQRA claims in the
separate Chestnut Ridge Action at the trial court level,
but lost at the Appellate Division.
In a grueling 76-page opinion, the court in Bernstein found that, because the plaintiffs’ claim rested
primarily on the Villages’ alleged collusion to bring the
Chestnut Ridge Action, the plaintiffs’ claims depended
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on whether there was an equal protections violation.
The court began by dismissing the plaintiffs’ contention that the Second Circuit’s decision in Fortress Bible
Church v. Feiner17 eliminated the requirement that
plaintiffs provide evidence of a similarly situated
comparator because the defendants allegedly inappropriately employed SEQRA. Rejecting this claim, the
court observed that Fortress Bible involved the question
of when SEQRA review constitutes the implementation
of a land use regulation under RLUIPA, not the question of whether municipal defendants have qualified
immunity when pursuing First Amendment protected
activity, such as the filing of a lawsuit.18
The court then found that the plaintiffs’ equal
protection claims failed because the plaintiffs had not
presented any evidence of a comparator development
“similarly situated in all respects.”19 The court also
noted that the plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of material fact with respect to the Villages’ discriminatory
intent, although the court did not question the sincerity
of plaintiffs’ allegations.20
The court then considered the plaintiffs’ substantial burden and nondiscrimination RLUIPA claims,
explaining that the applicability of these claims hinged
on two questions: (1) in filing the Chestnut Ridge Action, did the defendants “impose or implement” a land
use regulation, and (2) if not, did the defendants take
a “government action” in violation of RLUIPA? The
answer to each was “no.”
With respect to whether the Villages’ initiation of a
lawsuit challenging the Town’s SEQRA determination
constituted a imposition or implementation of a land
use regulation, the court explained,
There is a difference between imposing
or implementing a land use regulation,
and filing a lawsuit to ensure that another municipality imposes or implements its own land use regulation.…
[A] reading of RLUIPA [that implicates
the latter circumstances] would expand its scope far beyond its intended
targeting of the “widespread practice
of individualized decisions to grant or
refuse permission to use property for
religious purposes,” to include governing any action a local government may
take that could result in the enforcement of a land use regulation.21
Additionally, because the Town was the “involved
agency” under SEQRA that implemented and controlled the SEQRA review of the development, the
Town was the only entity that could have “implemented” the regulation.22

Section 1983
In Sherman v. Town of Chester,23 the U.S. District
Court for Southern District of New York denied in
part and granted in part the Town’s motion to dismiss
the plaintiff real estate developer’s retaliation claim,
which was based on evidence that the plaintiff was
singled out and “being suffocated with red tape,” but
dismissed the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Pending before
the federal district court in this case was the Town’s
renewed motion to dismiss following the Second
Circuit’s reversal of the court’s determination that the
plaintiff’s federal takings claim was unripe.
As a preliminary matter, the court noted that the
plaintiff incorrectly relied on the Second Circuit’s
conclusion that his takings claim constituted a continuing violation when he asserted that each of his federal
constitutional claims constituted a continuing violation.
Relatedly, the plaintiff argued that the tolling provision
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) applied to his other federal claims
because the prior litigation was voluntarily dismissed
pursuant to FRCP 41. Although acknowledging an
ambiguity in § 1367(d), the court nevertheless held that
the tolling provision applies only to pendent claims
dismissed pursuant to one of the four circumstances
described in § 1367(c) and not, as plaintiff argued, to
pendent claims dismissed for any other reason.
As to the retaliation claim, the court held the plaintiff showed the requisite requirements for his claim to
survive the Town’s motion to dismiss. For retaliation
claims made under the First Amendment, the Second Circuit requires that plaintiffs show only that the
plaintiff’s conduct is protected under the First Amendment and that the defendant’s conduct was motivated
by or substantially caused by the plaintiff’s exercise
of speech. The court concluded that the trial court’s
opinion that the Town “singled out Sherman’s development, suffocating him with red tape” over the course
of a decade to “make sure he could never succeed in
developing MareBrook” was sufficient to show that the
defendants’ conduct was motivated by or substantially
caused by the plaintiff’s exercise of speech, and evidence that the Town repeatedly refused the plaintiffs’
requests to enforce zoning codes over a nine-year period was sufficient to constitute a continuing violation.
However, the plaintiff’s due process claims did not
survive the motion to dismiss. They did not constitute
a continuing violation because they were based on
discrete acts by the Town that were readily discerned
by Sherman at the time the acts were taken. Finally,
with respect to the state law claims, because the claims
concerned the exercise of discretionary acts, the Town
was entitled to immunity.

SEQRA
On February 19, 2015, the Third Department ruled
in Troy Sand & Gravel Co. Inc. v. Town of Nassau24
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that, as an interested party, a town challenging a lead
agency SEQRA determination is permitted to make
its own findings under SEQRA, but the town’s environmental determination has to be based upon, and
is constrained by, the record developed by the lead
agency. This case involved the Town of Nassau’s efforts to challenge the Department of Environmental
Conservation’s (DEC) findings as to the environmental
impacts of a proposed commercial mining operation.
For a thorough analysis of this case, see Lisa Cobb’s
article, As an ‘Involved Agency,’ Independent SEQRA
Findings Are Limited, supra at page 14.
Citizens for St. Patrick’s v. City of Watervliet,25
discussed below under Standing and Other Jurisdictional Hurdles, involved challenges by individuals
who opposed a development to the City’s SEQRA
and rezoning determinations. In 2012, defendant PCP
Watervliet, LLC, a subsidiary of defendant Nigro
Companies, purchased a parcel of property containing a church, school and rectory that were no longer in
use in the City of Watervliet. Nigro petitioned the City
Council to rezone the parcel from residential to commercial, and, following public hearings, the City issued
a negative declaration and amended its zoning map
as requested. Individuals then brought a challenge
alleging that the City failed to comply with SEQRA,
engaged in illegal spot zoning and violated the Open
Meetings Law.
The Third Department held that the plaintiffs’
challenges to the SEQRA determination were moot
because the plaintiffs did not seek any injunctive relief
from the Court during the pendency of the appeal,
and the church buildings had been demolished and a
grocery store was fully constructed and operational on
the property.

Sign Ordinances
In Beck v. Town of Groton,26 the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of New York found that a
Town’s selective application of its sign ordinance was
unconstitutional. Article 3 section 316.7 of the Town
Code permitted a maximum of two signs of up to fifty
square feet in size on property zoned Rural–Agricultural (“RA”). In early 2009, the plaintiff began erecting
large signs on his property, which was zoned RA and
included approximately eight-tenths of a mile of frontage along Route 222 in Groton, New York.
When the Code Enforcement Officer of the Town
contacted the plaintiff and requested that he remove
the signage in violation of § 316.7, the plaintiff refused.
The Officer responded with a “Notice of Violation”
and, because the signage made mention of the Officer
by name accompanied with swastikas, a criminal mischief complaint.
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The court held that the plaintiff established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Town selectively enforced the Town Code in violation of the plaintiff’s
right to equal protection of the laws and in such a way
as to interfere with his right to free speech, and awarded him compensatory damages. The court first found
that § 316.7 of the Town Code was content-neutral on
its face because it regulated the size and number of
signs permitted on certain property, and its application was not dependent on the content of the sign. But,
the court found that the plaintiff presented sufficient
credible evidence to show he was treated differently
than his neighbor. The Town consistently and repeatedly enforced § 316.7 against plaintiff and did not bring
any enforcement action against his neighbor despite
two large signs posted on the neighbor’s property. The
court found the totality of the circumstances suggested
the officer acted with ill will and bad faith towards the
plaintiff when he contacted the Sheriff’s Department.
Between the drafting of this update and the publication of this issue, the U.S. Supreme Court is bound to
issue its decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.27 Depending on how the Court decides the case, municipalities
may need to act quickly to amend their sign regulations. For a detailed summary of the issues facing the
Court, see Land Use Law Update: Will Reed v. Town of
Gilbert Require Municipalities Throughout the Country to
Rewrite Their Sign Codes?28

Special Exceptions
In Nathan v. Board of Appeals of Town of Hempstead,29 the Appellate Division, Second Department,
held that where the property the petitioners wished to
use for a three-family residence did not meet the applicable lot-size requirements, the Board of Appeals correctly denied the petitioners’ application for a special
exception permit. The court explained that a special exception granted by a zoning board gives permission to
use property in a way that is consistent with the zoning
regulation, although not necessarily allowed as of right.
Thus, if, as here, the applicant failed to comply with
any of the conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance,
the zoning authority may deny the application.

Takings
The following two cases, although not New York
cases from 2015, highlight a tension many New York
municipalities are feeling as they examine whether to
provide greater protections of their coastal, riverine and
estuarine areas in order to decrease flood risk—i.e., will
the imposition of such protections constitute a taking,
or will the failure to impose such protections constitute
a taking?
In New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 4 v. City of New
York,30 the imposition of such protections was a regulatory taking. There, the Second Department found a rea-
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sonable probability that the city’s wetlands designation
was a regulatory taking under Penn Central. Although
the claimants proved only an 82% diminution of value
(“a diminution which, standing alone, is within the
range generally found to be insufficient to constitute a
regulatory taking”),
the parties agree[d] that, because of
the wetlands regulations, it is highly
improbable that the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation would issue a permit to develop the property in accordance with the
applicable R3-1 zoning, which allows
for attached and semi-attached oneand two- family dwellings, and that,
accordingly, the highest and best use
of the property is to leave it undeveloped and vacant. Thus, although the
purpose of the wetlands regulations
benefits the public good by providing
flood prevention and mitigation, the
wetlands regulations effectively prevent any economically beneficial use of
the property.
Thus, the court agreed with the trial court that
the 82% property value diminution together with the
effective prohibition on development of any part of the
property was sufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the imposition of the wetlands regulations
constituted a regulatory taking of the property.
But, in the possibly anomalous case of St. Bernard
Parish Government v. United States,31 a municipality’s
failure to adequately prevent flooding constituted a
temporary taking under Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States.32 In St. Bernard Parish, the court
ruled that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ failure to
properly maintain the Mississippi River–Gulf Outlet
(MR-GO), a seventy-six mile long navigational channel
constructed, expanded and operated by the Corps, resulted in a taking of private property without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause. The court
found that the Corps’ negligent design and failure to
maintain the MR-GO exacerbated flood damage from
Hurricane Katrina and several subsequent storms, and,
although temporary, wrongfully deprived landowners
of the use of their property.
According to the court, to prove a temporary taking, a plaintiff must show: (1) a protectable property
interest under state law; (2) the character of the property and the owners’ “reasonable-investment backed
expectations”; (3) foreseeability; (4) causation; and
(5) substantiality.33
The Fifth Circuit previously rejected tort theories of liability in the Katrina litigation as violative of
governmental immunity.34 But, in St. Bernard’s Parish,

by basing liability in large part on the Corps’ negligent
expansion and failure to maintain MR-GO, the court essentially expanded the Takings Clause to include negligent damage of private property by government failure
to act. Because the case involved negligent design and
maintenance, it leaves open the question of whether a
government entity could be liable for failure to act in
the face of foreseeable risks.

Standing and Other Jurisdictional Hurdles
In LaRocca v. Department of Planning, Environment, and Development of Town of Brookhaven,35 the
Second Department affirmed the lower court ruling
that dismissed the applicant’s claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The applicant had commenced a proceeding under Article 78 of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) seeking review
of the denial of his application for a building permit
by the Building Department. However, the applicant
had failed to appeal to the ZBA prior to seeking judicial
intervention and failed to establish that an exception
to the exhaustion doctrine was applicable. As a result,
he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.
Accordingly, the court found that the lower court
properly granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss
the petition.
In a March 2015 decision of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, Safe Harbor
Retreat, LLC v. Town of East Hampton,36 the court
dismissed the plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act and Americans with Disabilities Act claims as unripe because
the plaintiff failed to apply for a required permit and
instead appealed the determination that a permit was
required.
Plaintiff Safe Harbor Retreat, LLC had proposed an
“executive retreat” for persons suffering from alcoholism and other forms of substance addiction. The town’s
senior building inspector determined that Safe Harbor
met the criteria of “functioning as a family unit” and
therefore permitted in a residential zone without site
plan approval. As a result, Safe Harbor claims that it
expended significant funds and effort to establish the
community residence. After a period in which public
officials and others visited and praised the community
residence, a competitor complained about it and local
opposition groups formed. The building inspector then
reversed his position, informing Safe Harbor that it was
operating an unauthorized “Semi–Public Facility, in
a residential district,” and that, pursuant to the town
code, a special permit was required. However, rather
than seeking a special permit from the town’s planning
board, Safe Harbor filed an application with the ZBA
to appeal the determination.37 The ZBA held a hearing
on the application and entered an order affirming the
building inspector’s determination that Safe Harbor
was operating a semi-public facility in a residential
district and therefore a special use permit was required.
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The court found that because of Safe Harbor’s
failure to seek a special permit, the Town had not
rendered a final decision regarding Safe Harbor’s use
of its premises. For the same reason, the Town had
not had the opportunity to make an accommodation
through the Town’s “established procedures used
to adjust the neutral policy in question.”38 Quoting
Sunrise Detox, the court noted that “[a] federal lawsuit
at this stage would inhibit the kind of give-and-take
negotiation that often resolves land use problems, and
would in that way impair or truncate a process that
must be allowed to run its course.”39 Accordingly, the
court found that the action was not ripe and dismissed
it without prejudice.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York dismissed another Fair Housing Act claim in
another March 2015 decision, Amityville Mobile Home
Civic Association v. Town of Babylon.40 The court
dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granted Rule 11 sanctions
against plaintiffs’ counsel.
Plaintiffs are Amityville Mobile Home Civic Association (AMHCA) and the residents of Frontier Park,
a mobile home park. Defendant Frontier, a private
developer, filed an application with the Town, which
the Town approved, to rezone the property from Multiple Residential to accommodate a mixed-use multiresidential development. The Town then adopted a
relocation plan, which provided relocation assistance
funds ($20,000). The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that
defendants violated numerous federal laws including
the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Frontier contended and the court agreed that the
case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ claims were based on
the incorrect premise that the relocation plan required
the residents to sign a release giving up their “rights”
to the one-hundred affordable/workforce units in
the new development. The complaint contained no
allegations that any plaintiffs executed the documents
associated with the Plan; nor did it allege that plaintiffs
applied for the affordable/workforce housing units
or were denied the units based upon their agreement
to the Plan. The court found that the plaintiffs could
not plausibly allege that execution of the Plan documents foreclosed any “right” to the affordable housing
because the Plan contained no such provision.41
On May 8, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York dismissed 545 Halsey
Lane Properties, LLC v. Town of Southampton42 on
ripeness grounds. This case involves challenges of two
decisions by the Planning Board regarding conditional
approvals of the plaintiff’s applications for a building
permit for the construction of a barn or barns on its
property. The plaintiff 545 Halsey Lane Properties, LLC
32

commenced the federal action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against defendants Town of Southhampton, Town
of Southhampton Planning Board, and the members of
the Planning Board. The plaintiff also commenced two
related state court proceedings pursuant to CPLR Article 78 to challenge the decisions of the Planning Board.
On April 8, 2015, the court had ruled that members
of the Planning Board were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the complaint as against those
individuals in their individual capacities. The court
found the members of the Planning Board could not
be deemed to have violated “clearly established law”
under the Town Code. Furthermore, even if they could
be deemed to have violated “clearly established law,”
the court determined that their actions were objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. In the same order,
the court rejected the Defendants’ ripeness argument,
finding that the resolutions issued by the Planning
Board, which were not appealable to the Town’s ZBA,
constituted “final, definitive positions as to how it could
use its property” sufficient to establish the ripeness of
its Equal Protection claim.
Subsequently, the defendants moved for and the
court granted reconsideration of the April 8 order. The
defendants argued on reconsideration that the court
misapprehended their ripeness argument and, alternatively, that the court’s qualified immunity ruling was
erroneous. The court agreed that the claims were not
ripe and therefore did not address the defendants’ arguments on reconsideration regarding qualified immunity.
With respect to ripeness, the defendants had argued
that an earlier order remitting one of the Article 78
proceedings to the Planning Board for factual determinations had rendered the action unripe. In more than
one prior order, the court had rejected this argument,
reasoning, in part, that because it has “held that the
Article 78 proceedings do not render the present action
[un]ripe, it follows that the specter of additional Article
78 proceedings does not render an otherwise ripe claim
unripe.”43 Upon reconsideration, the court agreed with
the defendants that “it is not future Article 78 proceedings that call this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction
over this action into question. Rather, it is the future
proceedings before the Planning Board, the administrative agency with authority to resolve the Plaintiff’s site
plan applications, that does so.”44
In holding that the claims were unripe, the court
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that further efforts to
obtain approval from the Planning Board were futile.
The court noted that, in the land use context, the futility
exception applies when the agency “lacks discretion to
grant variances or has dug in its heels and made clear
that all such applications will be denied.”45 The court
also noted, however, that “courts in [the Second] Circuit
have recognized that mere allegations of open hostility
[are] not sufficient to invoke the futility exception.”46
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The court found that the futility exception did not
apply because, although the town attorney has taken
a position on the issue, no commentary suggests the
Planning Board has an entrenched position, the Planning Board had discretion to make the final determination, and any delay by the administrative body was not
sufficiently extreme to justify application of the futility
exception.47
The Third Department affirmed dismissal on
mootness grounds and noted that the Town violated
the open meetings law in Ballard v. New York Safety
Track, LLC.48 The case involved an agreement between
the Town and owners of a motorcycle safety training
facility to permit the owners to host certain events
at the facility in 2013 that were allegedly not among
the uses authorized by the site plan. The agreement
expired by its own terms in 2013. The court observed
that where the passage of time or a change in circumstances prevents a court from rendering a decision that
would effectively determine an actual controversy, the
claim must be dismissed. Thus, because the agreement
pertained solely to land uses during 2013 and expired
at the end of that year, the court ruled that the cause of
action became moot when the agreement expired.
Ballard’s ruling on the open meeting law violation
is summarized above.
The Third Department also affirmed dismissal
on mootness grounds in Citizens for St. Patrick’s v.
City of Watervliet.49 This case involved challenges by
individuals who opposed a development to the City’s
SEQRA and rezoning determinations. In 2012, defendant PCP Watervliet, LLC, a subsidiary of defendant
Nigro Companies, purchased a parcel of property
containing a church, school and rectory that were no
longer in use in the City of Watervliet. Nigro petitioned
the City Council to rezone the parcel from residential
to commercial, and, following public hearings, the City
issued a negative declaration and amended its zoning
map as requested. Individuals then brought a challenge
alleging that the City failed to comply with SEQRA,
engaged in illegal spot zoning and violated the Open
Meetings Law. The trial court granted the defendants’
motions for summary judgment.
As a preliminary matter, the court found that
plaintiffs Carol Falaro and Patrick Falaro presumptively established their standing to challenge the City’s
determinations because their residence is located across
the street from Nigro’s parcel and they will suffer direct
harm different from the general public, even without
allegations of individual harm.
But, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ challenges
to the SEQRA and rezoning determinations were moot
because they did not seek any injunctive relief from
the Court during the pendency of the appeal, and the
church buildings had been demolished and a grocery

store was fully constructed and operational on the
property. The rezoning determination had also been
superseded by the City’s adoption of a new zoning
code in 2013, under which Nigro’s use of the parcel is
permitted as of right, and the plaintiffs did not raise
any challenge to the new code.
For another disposition based on a lack of standing,
see the discussion of Fund for Lake George, Inc. v. Town
of Queensbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals50 under Variances below.

Variances
In Mimassi v. Town of Whitestown Zoning Bd. of
Appeals51 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
reversed the lower court’s denial of a petition to annul
the ZBA’s denial of an application for an area variance
and remitted the application to the ZBA for a de novo
determination. The court began by rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the determination of the ZBA
was arbitrary and capricious because the Town failed
to adhere to its precedent, finding instead that the
petitioner failed to establish that a previous decision
by the Town on another case was based on essentially
the same facts as petitioner’s claim. However, the court
held that the lower court’s denial of the petition was
nevertheless error because the ZBA did not “weigh the
benefit to [petitioner] of granting the variance[] against
any detriment to the health, safety and welfare of the
neighborhood or community affected thereby, taking
into account the five factors set forth in Town Law §
267-b(3)(b)”52; rather, the ZBA based its determination
on the no-longer-followed “practical difficulty” test.
In John Hatgis, LLC v. DeChance53 the Appellate
Division, Second Department, affirmed the trial court’s
dismissal of petitioner’s claims, holding that the ZBA of
the Town of Brookhaven properly engaged in the balancing test prescribed by Town Law § 267–b(3)(b) when
denying the petitioner’s application for an area variance to maintain an accessory apartment on the subject
premises. Rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the
ZBA failed to satisfactorily address all five statutory
factors, the court reasoned that “no single statutory
factor is determinative, but merely one consideration
in a broader balancing test. Moreover, the ZBA is entitled to consider the effect its decision would have as
precedent.”54
The court also held that the ZBA’s conclusions
in support of its determination were not arbitrary
or capricious. Specifically, the ZBA’s conclusion that
the grant of the variance would produce an undesirable change in the character of the neighborhood and
a detriment to nearby properties was based on the
testimony of the attendees at the public hearing and the
ZBA’s own familiarity with local conditions; the hardship alleged by the petitioner was self-created, as the
petitioner acquired the property subject to the restric-
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tion; and, the ZBA’s conclusion that a feasible alternative to the variance existed was supported by the fact
that the petitioner could have easily reduced the size of
the accessory apartment. The court also noted without explanation that the ZBA’s determination that the
requested variance was substantial was not arbitrary
or capricious.
In another case involving area variances (and
standing), Fund for Lake George, Inc. v. Town of
Queensbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals,55 the Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed the ZBA’s
determination that the petitioner, an engineering firm
with no discernible connection to the project at issue,
lacked standing to challenge the ZBA’s granting of area
variances to a residential property owner, and found
that the ZBA had a rational basis for granting the area
variances. In order to facilitate the construction of a
residence on the subject property, respondents applied
to the ZBA for area variances requesting relief from
requirements regarding removal of vegetation and
setbacks for stormwater infiltration devices. The ZBA
granted the variances. The petitioner, a professional
engineer who claimed to be representing a number
of neighbors opposed to the project, requested and
received determinations from the Town’s zoning administrator on a number of issues, and appealed to the
ZBA, which dismissed the appeal for lack of standing.
Since neither the petitioner nor his firm (which
was listed on the notice of appeal as appellant) exhibited any specialized harm and did not own property
near the subject property, and the petitioner failed to
identify the neighbors he claimed to represent, the
court found that the petitioner did not have standing
in his individual capacity or as an agent for his firm.
The court based its holding on its interpretation of a
Town Code provision that permits appeals by “any
person aggrieved” by, among other things, the zoning
administrator’s decisions. The court found that this
language appears to have been taken from Town Law
§ 267–a(4), which “has been consistently interpreted to
mean a person who has sustained special damage, different in kind and degree from the community generally,” which can be shown “if he or she falls within the
statute’s zone of interests and his or her property is
sufficiently proximate to the property at issue.”56
Despite the petitioner’s lack of standing, the court
went on to consider the merits, noting that, although
the ZBA’s resolution failed to set forth specific factual
findings, the ZBA’s decision to grant the area variances
had a rational basis because the resolution and hearing
minutes show that the ZBA engaged in the statutorily
prescribed balancing test. The court reasoned that
[W]e need not annul the determination or remit the matter if the record,
including the ZBA’s formal return
in the CPLR article 78 proceeding,
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demonstrates that the ZBA did make
specific factual findings supporting its
determination.… Although the evidence as to the statutory factors seems
somewhat evenly split, courts do not
engage in their own balancing of the
factors, but must yield to the ZBA’s discretion and weighing of the evidence.57
In People, Inc. v City of Tonawanda Zoning Bd. of
Appeals,58 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department
reversed the trial court, which had granted the developer petitioner’s CPLR article 78 petition. The court held
that substantial evidence in the record supported the
ZBA’s conclusion that granting two requested area variances would cause increased population density from
the presence of an apartment building in a neighborhood comprised of single-family homes, that the variances necessary to accommodate an apartment building
would be substantial, and that the petitioners’ difficulty
was self-created because they were aware of the property’s zoning classification when they purchased the
property. Because the board reviewed the prescribed
statutory factors in making its determination, and
rendered its determination after properly weighing the
benefit to petitioners against the detriment to the health,
safety and welfare of the neighborhood or community
if the variances were granted, the court concluded that
the action taken by the Board was not illegal, arbitrary
or capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
In April 2015, the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Nemeth v. Village of Hancock Zoning Board
of Appeals,59 overruled the lower court, ruling that the
ZBA should not have granted a use variance where the
respondent’s proof consisted of bare conclusory statements that their business would fail without a use variance. Petitioners in the case owned property adjacent
to the property owned by the respondents, on which
the respondents operated an industrial manufacturing business as a nonconforming use. The respondent
property owners had applied for and received a use
variance from respondent Village of Hancock ZBA, allowing the continued use of an addition in the manufacturing process made in 2001 after a zoning code was
enacted prohibiting manufacturing in the zone where
the property was located. The lower court dismissed
the petitioner’s claim.
The court first discussed that an applicant for a use
variance bears the burden of demonstrating, among
other things, that the property cannot yield a reasonable
return if used for any of the purposes permitted as it is
currently zoned. Such an inability to yield a reasonable
return must be established through the submission of
“dollars and cents” proof with respect to each permitted use. In this case, however, respondent’s proof consisted of conclusory statements that an additional “10 to
20 percent” of revenue would be needed to find a simi-
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larly sized location to house the equipment and that
“we would go out of business” without the addition.
Because there was insufficient proof, the court held that
the ZBA should not have granted the variance.
Judge Lynch wrote a dissenting opinion, noting
that “[j]udicial review of a zoning board determination
is limited to an examination of whether it has a rational
basis and is supported by substantial evidence,”60 and
arguing that the determination here met this standard.
In an instance, as here, where a use
variance is required to expand a
nonconforming use the applicant must
demonstrate that the land cannot yield
a reasonable return if used as it then
exists or for any other use allowed in
the zone. As such,…[t]he core question remains whether respondents
established that the property could
not yield a reasonable rate of return
without utilizing the addition in the
manufacturing process, or otherwise
utilizing the entire parcel for residential purposes.… In considering the
property as it then exists,…we must
account for the fact that the addition
had been utilized in the manufacturing
process since 2001, until precluded by
this Court’s decision in 2012. Respondent [ZBA]…concluded that the cost of
converting the addition to a residential
use, relocating the facility and/or shutting down manufacturing in the addition demonstrated that respondents
could not realize a reasonable return
on the property without a use variance
for the addition. The ZBA relied upon
documented proof…that a renovation
of the addition for residential use…
would cost over $160,000, resulting in
a net monthly loss of $333. In addition,
the Delaware County Department of
Economic Development estimated
the cost of relocating the manufacturing facility at between $1.5 and $2.2
million. [Respondent] Perry Kuehn
testified that, without the addition,
respondents would have to conduct
part of the manufacturing process in
a separate location off site, resulting
in an estimated 10% to 20% extra cost
that would put them out of business.
Moreover, as a practical matter, given
the prohibitive cost of relocating the
manufacturing facility, a conversion
of the entire property to a residential
use would effect a closure of the business, which employs approximately

12 people. As such, it is manifest that
a residential conversion would not
yield a reasonable rate of return, such
that specific dollars and cents proof
for a residential option is simply
unnecessary.61
Judge Lynch also noted that the ZBA could have
rationally concluded that the property was unique
and the proposed use would not alter the character of
the neighborhood, because the property contained a
long-standing, nonconforming industrial use that had
included the addition since 2001, and that the hardship
was not self-imposed because the Kuehns purchased
the property before the Village enacted its zoning code.
In Traendly v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of
Southold,62 the Appellate Division, Second Department held that the denial by the ZBA of the petitioners’
application for area and lot-width variances to build
a single-family dwelling had a rational basis and was
supported by evidence in the record. The court overruled the trial court, which had granted the applicant’s
Article 78 petition, annulled the ZBA’s determination,
and directed the ZBA to grant the application.
Without discussion of the record evidence, the
court found that the granting of the variances would
have resulted in the creation of “the most nonconforming lot in a unique neighborhood,”63 the requested variances were substantial, and the petitioners’ hardship
was self-created. The court also found that the ZBA’s
granting of a particular prior application for an area
variance did not constitute a precedent from which the
ZBA was required to explain a departure, because the
petitioners had failed to establish that the prior application bore sufficient factual similarity to the subject
application.

Vested Rights
In Cobleskill Stone Products, Inc. v. Town of Schoharie,64 the Appellate Division, Third Department, held
that the failure to obtain a special permit does not preclude the ability to establish a vested right to mine on
property. The petitioner in this case operated a quarry
in the Town of Schoharie, which had been in operation
since the 1890s. Pursuant to respondent Town of Schoharie’s 1975 zoning ordinance, “commercial excavation or mining” was a permitted use upon receipt of a
special permit from the Town. Petitioner purchased an
additional parcel of real property to the south of the
areas that it actively mined, and then commenced this
combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory
judgment action seeking a judgment declaring that it
had a vested right to quarry as a preexisting nonconforming use under Local Law No. 2 and any subsequently enacted prohibitory zoning amendment.
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On appeal from the Supreme Court’s order granting the petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment, the Third Department reasoned that, although
a special permit was required for mining operations
between 1975 and 2005, petitioner’s failure to obtain one did not, as a matter of law, preclude it from
establishing that it had a vested right to mine on its
property notwithstanding a current or future prohibitive zoning ordinance. Because of this, the court found
the Supreme Court erred in granting partial summary
judgment to respondents dismissing the vested right
cause of action based on petitioner’s failure to obtain a
special permit pursuant to the 1975 zoning ordinance.
Additionally, the court found that the Supreme Court’s
judgment, partially granting the petition and annulling
Local Law No. 2, did not render the appeal moot, because, if a new zoning ordinance with the same prohibition against mining were to be enacted, a declaration
that petitioner had a vested right as against the earlier
law would affect the rights of the parties. Accordingly,
the court dismissed the order of the Supreme Court.

Wireless Broadband
Patricia Salkin’s Law of the Land blog65 provided
an excellent summary of a January 2015 U.S. Supreme
Court opinion on the Telecommunications Act’s “in
writing” requirement for land use decisions relating to
the siting of cell towers, as follows:
T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of
Roswell[66] was a case brought by a
“personal wireless service provider”
under the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (TCA) which, among other
things, supported rapid deployment
of personal communications devices
(e.g., cell phones) by requiring that
land use decisions on matters relating
to such things as cell towers be “in
writing” and supported by substantial
evidence from a written record. In this
case defendant City denied plaintiff’s cell tower application by letter,
informing plaintiff that it could find
the reasons for the denial in the City
Council minutes. There was a 30-day
appeal period under the TCA; however, the City’s draft minutes were
not approved until four days before
the appeal period ran. Nevertheless,
plaintiff challenged the denial in federal court on the “in writing” requirement and also alleged the denial was
not supported by substantial evidence.
The trial court found for the plaintiff
but the Eleventh Circuit, following a
majority of circuits, found the letter
and reference to the minutes to be
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sufficient. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
Justice Sotomayor wrote for the Court
and interpreted the “in writing” and
“substantial evidence” requirements to
require reasons to be given for judicial review purposes. … [The Court
explained that [t]he use of “substantial
evidence” in the TCA was a “term of
art,” describing how an administrative
record was to be reviewed by a court
under the TCA. The Court inferred
that Congress required findings to be
derived from the administrative process, rejecting the City’s contention that
this requirement would deprive it of
its local zoning authority [and] finding
that Congress meant to interfere with
local zoning processes to this extent,
but stressing that the reasons need not
be elaborate—just sufficiently clear to
enable judicial review.
Moreover, the Court determined that
the TCA did not require that the reasons be found in the decision or be in
any particular form, as the TCA stated
it did not otherwise affect the authority
of a local zoning authority…. However,
the Court did [find that the TCA’s text
and structure] require that the reasons
be given either in the decision or essentially contemporaneous with the
same. By waiting until 26 days after
its decision to issue detailed approved
minutes, the City failed its statutory
obligations and the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit was reversed.
Justice Alito concurred, adding that it
would be sufficient for the City to state
simply that the proposal was “esthetically incompatible with the surrounding area,” [and] that plaintiff was not
injured by the City’s delay in providing
the final version of the minutes (which
he viewed as harmless error)….
Chief Justice Roberts authored a dissent, in which Justices Ginsburg and
Thomas joined, stating that, while
findings or reasons for the decision
were required, they need not be issued
“essentially contemporaneously” with
the decision, as such a requirement was
not in the TCA, noting that Congress
has in other legislation, such as the
Administrative Procedures Act and
other sections of the TCA itself, made
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such a specific requirement. Moreover,
the dissent observed that the “sole
issue” before the court was the “in
writing” requirement and not the timing of the findings, an issue not raised
below. While agreeing that findings
were implicitly required by the use of
the “substantial evidence” standard, if
they were not given or [were] inadequate, remand would be justified,
rejecting the contention that plaintiff
needed to see the reasons in order to
decide whether to appeal[.]
Finally, the dissent suggests that impacts of this case on local governments
will be “small”—they need only hold
back the final decision until the minutes [are] transcribed or reasons given.
It appears the entire Court would conclude that the TCA requires reasons
for a land use decision involving cell
towers; however, the justices disagree on the required timing of those
reasons. This result may come as a
surprise for some local governments.
In Orange County-Poughkeepsie Limited Partnership v. Town of Fishkill,67 the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York found that the
plaintiffs Orange County–Poughkeepsie Limited
Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless and Homeland
Towers, LLC satisfied their obligation to make an effort
to evaluate alternative locations for a communications
tower, the Board’s denial of the plaintiffs’ application
for a special permit left the plaintiffs with no feasible
means of filling the gap in wireless coverage, and
the Board’s denial of the application on grounds that
the proposed 150-foot tall monopole wireless facility
would decrease property values was not supported by
substantial evidence.
In this case, Verizon had sought to construct a new
wireless telecommunications facility within an R-1
Residential Zoning District. Under the Town of East
Fishkill’s Zoning Code, a special permit was required
for the construction of a wireless communication facility within the residential zoning district and the maximum height of a freestanding tower in a residential
area was 110 feet. The plaintiffs submitted a joint application for a special permit with requests for a 40-foot
height variance. The Board retained a wireless consultant, which advised the Board that “the proposed
site only provides approximately 20% new coverage
(un-duplicated) and nearly 80% overlaps with existing
coverage,” and denied the application.
The court began by granting summary judgment
on the plaintiffs’ effective prohibition claim. Under the

TCA, local governments retain authority over “decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities,” but may
not “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.”68 The first prong of
the Willoth effective prohibition test, which requires a
plaintiff to establish that a significant gap in wireless
coverage exists, was satisfied by the defendants’ concession of that fact. The second prong of the test recognizes
that a local government may deny an applicant’s proposal if an applicant may “select a less sensitive site,…
reduce the tower height,…use a preexisting structure
or…camouflage the tower and/or antennae.”69 The
court found that the second prong was also satisfied because the record demonstrated that the plaintiffs evaluated alternative locations and the Board’s denial of the
plaintiffs’ application left the plaintiffs with no feasible
means of filling the gap in wireless coverage.
The court then found that the Board’s denial of the
application on the grounds that the proposed tower
would lower property values was not supported by
substantial evidence and ordered the Board to grant
the application. The record showed that the proposed
site was near four large ham radio towers in the neighborhood and the neighbors opposing the application
acknowledged that the towers existed at the time they
purchased their homes.

Written Requests (Town Law)
In another case involving a failed attempt to rely on
board minutes as a writing, Smith v. Stephens Media
Group-Watertown, LLC,70 the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department held that the written record of an
oral request in the minutes of a town board meeting
was not sufficient to satisfy the written request requirement set forth in Town Law § 268(2). The plaintiff landowners commenced this action seeking enforcement
of the Town of Rutland Code § 130–48(E)(1)(g), which
requires that “the minimum setback distance of a communications tower from all property lines shall be equal
to 100% of the height of the communications tower.”
The plaintiffs alleged that the size of the parcel owned
by the defendant was insufficient to permit its 370–foot
radio transmission tower to meet the minimum setback
distance. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief enjoining the alleged violation.
The appellate court found that the court below
erred in denying the part of the defendant’s motion
seeking summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’
claim pursuant to Town Law § 268(2), which provides
“upon the failure or refusal of the proper local officer,
board or body of the town to institute [any appropriate
action or proceedings to prevent or restrain the violation of its zoning laws] for a period of ten days after
written request by a resident taxpayer of the town so
to proceed, any three taxpayers of the town who are
jointly or severally aggrieved by such violation, may
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institute such appropriate action or proceeding in like
manner as such local officer, board or body of the town
is authorized to do.” The court explained that, because
the written record of their oral request in the minutes
of the town board meeting did not satisfy the requirement of a written request and the plaintiffs failed to
show that they made any other written request contemplated by the statute, they “failed to satisfy a condition precedent to maintaining their claim pursuant
to the statute.”71 The plaintiff’s appeal was therefore
dismissed, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss was
granted.

Zoning Interpretation
In Boni Enterprises, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Clifton Park,72 the Appellate Division, Third Department held the ZBA erred in finding that the Town Code prohibited petitioners Boni
Enterprises, LLC and Country Club Acres, Inc. from
constructing 74 one-family dwellings. Petitioners, who
owned contiguous parcels of property in the Town of
Clifton Park, submitted a revised application for site
plan review to the planning board, outlining a plan
to build 74 dwellings and 15 commercial buildings.
The Planning Board contended that it was unable to
consider the application because the Town’s Zoning
Enforcement Officer concluded that there were zoning
issues with petitioners’ site plan and the ZBA agreed
that the town code prohibited construction of multiple
single-family dwellings on the Boni Enterprises parcel.
Petitioners responded with a combined CPLR article 78
proceeding and action for declaratory judgment.
The court first noted that the lower court erred in
granting deference to the ZBA because no deference is
allowed if the issue is one of pure legal interpretation
of the zoning law. The court then found that, pursuant to the town code’s definitions of “dwelling” and
“building,” the word “buildings” in the code provision
that allows “[m]ultiple buildings on a lot” includes
one-family dwellings. The court noted,
[T]he words building and dwelling are
not synonymous and cannot be used
interchangeably, because a dwelling is
a subset of the broader term building.
Stated another way, not every building
is a dwelling, but every dwelling is a
building. We agree with respondents
that respondent Town of Clifton Park
probably never envisioned a landowner being able to build 74 one-family
dwellings on a single, unsubdivided
parcel in a business district. Nevertheless, the plain language of the Town
Code, strictly construed against the
municipality, must be interpreted as
permitting multiple buildings—including one-family dwellings—on a
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single lot as long as they do not exceed
the density limitations.73
The court also considered and rejected arguments
that the Town had provided inadequate notice of
proposed Local Law No. 8 (which amended the zoning
ordinance to create a business district covering an area
that contains the Country Club Acres parcel) and that
the failure of the town to update its zoning map, which
is unofficial and available merely as a reference tool,
invalidated the local law. The court therefore reversed
the dismissal of the petitioner Boni Enterprises’ claims
and declared that the Town Code does not prohibit
Boni Enterprises from constructing multiple one-family
dwellings on a single lot in the B–1 district, Local Law
No. 8 was properly enacted, and petitioner Country
Club Acres’ parcel is located in the zoning districts as
set forth by Local Law No. 8.
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